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Serving as “gateways”, some world cities tie their wider hinter-
lands to global networks. The article revisits gateway–hinterland 
relations against the backdrop of assessments that lead to op-
posed conclusions on the benefits and shortcomings of integra-
tion into the world economy. Referring to the oil and gas sector 
in Argentina and Ghana, it answers the question of how gate-
ways interact with subordinate places and also uncovers obsta-
cles to peripheral development. The author finds that Accra and 
Buenos Aires concentrate corporate control. Argentina's capital 
serves as a gateway for knowledge generation and logistics too. 
Opportunities for peripheral development in both countries are 
considerable, albeit largely limited to generic services. Besides a 
certain concentration of business activities in the gateway cities, 
more important challenges to peripheral development are typi-
cal for small and medium enterprises (insufficient finance and 
management capabilities, unawareness of business opportuni-
ties, and the like). They include rent seeking and subcontracting. 
The latter leaves local companies in a particularly weak position 
vis-à-vis lead firms. The author argues that while integration 
into the world economy allows for peripheral development, the 
corresponding outcomes may not meet everyone's expectations. 
Related expectations must, therefore, be more down-to-earth 
than overly optimistic statements frequently made by politicians.
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1 |  INTRODUCTION
As Sigler nicely summarises, “world cities research is predicated upon a hypothesis about how cities 
serve as strategic nodes within the contemporary global economy” (2016, p. 392). They are critical 
hinges in networks that crisscross the globe. As such, they tie numerous places involved in the increas-
ingly fragmented production of goods and services together, generating impulses for peripheral devel-
opment—through investment in additional activities in the region under consideration—or limiting 
such prospects by connections to activities elsewhere.
Several contributions by organisations and scholars involved in development policy are marked by an 
optimistic notion on peripheral development in global networks. Most prominently, Morris, Kaplinsky, 
and Kaplan (2012a, 2012b) argue that “one thing leads to another”: integration into global networks 
triggers local dynamics because of linkages from which peripheral sites benefit under certain conditions. 
The World Development Report from 2009 extends this optimism to the related role of world cities. It 
suggests that developing countries tie themselves to nearby “leading areas”, meaning agglomerations 
such as world cities that generate impulses for their wider hinterlands (World Bank, 2009). Scholvin 
(2017) shows how Cape Town interlinks places all over sub-Saharan Africa globally, exerting positive 
effects in some cases. Breul, Revilla Diez, and Sambodo (2019), conversely, suggest that world cities 
serve as “gateways” and are marked by “filtering mechanisms” that hamper peripheral development.
In spite of its merits, the article by Breul and his co-authors is overly pessimistic. It reveals that so-
phisticated business activities hardly relocate to peripheral locations, but how realistic are corresponding 
expectations? Moreover, is concentration in a world city that serves as a gateway the only and/or the most 
important obstacle to peripheral development? By assessing different functions of gateways, this article 
revisits the relationships of gateway/world cities and subordinate places. It focusses on the oil and gas sector 
in Argentina and Ghana, answering two questions: How do world cities that serve as gateways interact with 
subordinate places? What factors—other than the gateway city—hamper peripheral development?1
It is shown that corporate control relating to business activities in the respective national hinter-
lands takes place in Accra and Buenos Aires. Argentina's capital also serves as a gateway for knowl-
edge generation and logistics, thus concentrating many activities necessary to explore and extract 
hydrocarbon resources. Technical services, meanwhile, are provided from places closer to oil and gas 
fields. In Ghana, not only service provision, but also logistics and transport functions are carried out 
in a peripheral town: Takoradi. This decentralisation—along with the incorporation of local firms into 
the sector and related processes of upgrading/upskilling—indicates that integration into the world 
economy has positive effects on the periphery. Nonetheless, firms from resource peripheries largely 
provide generic services and there are also important obstacles to peripheral development. These are 
challenges typical for small and medium enterprises (SMEs), rent seeking, and subcontracting by 
non-local lead firms rather than filtering mechanisms by Accra and Buenos Aires.
The remainder of this article is structured as follows: the first section introduces the conceptual 
background. The state of the art on world cities serving as gateways is summarised with particular 
regard to the controversial evaluation of developmental consequences. Afterwards, the case selection 
and research methodology are explained. The third section presents the empirical findings. The article 
concludes with policy implications and ideas for follow-up studies.
2 |  CONCEPTUAL BACKGROUND
The gateway concept offers a particular perspective on world cities. It draws attention to city– 
hinterland relations and the manifold ways in which world cities integrate their respective 
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hinterlands into global networks (Scholvin, 2019b, 2020, 2021; Scholvin, Breul, & Revilla Diez, 
2019; Scholvin, Françoso, Mello, Breul, & Hiratuka, 2019). A gateway city can be defined as “an 
entrance into (and necessarily an exit out of) some area” (Burghardt, 1971, p. 269). Sigler’s (2013) 
related concept of “relational cities” accordingly deals with intermediary services, ranging from 
offshore banking to container shipping. Others have assessed gateway cities as nodes in flows of for-
eign investment and trade (Chubarov & Brooker, 2013; Grant, 2008), international migration (Price 
& Benton-Short, 2008), and maritime transport (Lee & Ducruet, 2009; Notteboom, 2007). Short, 
Breitbach, Buckman, and Essex (2000) argue that all cities are gateways to some extent, globalising 
their spheres of influence in cultural, economic, and political terms. Contributions that stand in the 
tradition of the Globalisation and World Cities (GaWC) research network more narrowly deal with 
corporate control and corporate service provision (among others: Parnreiter, 2010, 2015; Parnreiter, 
Haferburg, & Oßenbrügge, 2013; Rossi, Beaverstock, & Taylor, 2007; Taylor, Walker, Catalano, & 
Hoyler, 2002).
An analysis that aims at the division of business activities between gateway cities and hinterland 
locations, and seeks to derive conclusions on peripheral development must go beyond the GaWC 
approach (Coe, Dicken, Hess, & Yeung, 2010). Scholvin, Breul, et al. (2019) as well as Scholvin, 
Françoso, et al. (2019) therefore suggest that world cities that serve as gateways fulfil up to five func-
tions, being (a) hubs for logistics and transport, (b) sites of industrial processing, (c) places of corpo-
rate control and (d) service provision, as well as (e) locations where knowledge is generated. Service 
provision is more than corporate services on accountancy, advertising, banking/finance, and the law. 
These stand at the core of GaWC research, but integration into the world economy also depends on 
technical services that are not available in many locations in the Global South, at least not to the so-
phistication required in some sectors.
In addition to characterising gateway cities in Argentina and Ghana along four of the five just men-
tioned functions, this article contributes to better understanding their relevance for peripheral devel-
opment. There are numerous endogenous and exogenous factors that determine economic dynamics in 
the periphery of the world economy. Gateway cities are one condition among many. Nonetheless, crit-
ical relevance has been ascribed to them. As noted, the 2009 World Development Report suggests that 
developing countries bind themselves to such agglomerations, allowing for the free flow of capital, 
goods, and people so as to benefit from impulses that these leading areas supposedly generate. After 
an initial period of increasing concentration in the leading areas, more and more economic activities 
are expected to spread to the periphery, inducing development there (World Bank, 2009). Scholvin 
(2017) finds such processes in the sub-Saharan African oil and gas sector, which benefits from Cape 
Town interlinking it globally.
There is, however, an increasingly large body of academic literature that maintains that the periphery 
hardly develops in spite of its integration into the world economy. These publications focus on the fail-
ure of diversification of the local economies under consideration and the formation of enclaves therein 
(among others: Arias, Atienza, & Cademartori, 2014; Atienza, Lufin, & Soto, 2018; Fabinyi, 2016; 
MacKinnon, 2013; Murphy & Carmody, 2015). Breul et  al.  (2019) argue that gateway cities con-
centrate sophisticated activities that should rather disperse to peripheral sites in order to structurally 
transform the corresponding local economies. The reason for the concentration in gateway cities is 
that institutions in resource peripheries and world cities that serve as gateways bargain with extra-re-
gional corporations, seeking to attract foreign investment. For sophisticated, high value-adding tasks, 
gateway cities usually outcompete peripheral locations. The existence of a gateway decreases the need 
to carry out activities such as logistics and transport in the periphery. Gateway cities also benefit from 
path dependencies, once firms have invested in industrial processing or located corporate control there. 
Breul and his co-authors associate these processes with the “dark side” of economic geography—a 
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term coined by Phelps, Atienza, and Arias (2018). Referring to Coe and Yeung (2015), Breul and his 
co-authors suggest that the integration of peripheral locations into global networks can sometimes be 
unsuccessful in terms of development because of the related role of gateway cities.
Regardless of the causes, the answer to the question of whether integration into the world econ-
omy and the related role of gateway cities hamper peripheral development or are conducive thereof 
depends on one's expectations concerning economic dynamics in the periphery. Argentina's former 
president Mauricio Macri claimed that unconventional oil and gas in north Patagonia “will cause a 
revolution of employment in Argentina” (Perfil, 2017, author's translation). He also stated that these 
resources “will transform us into a world power in energy” (Clarín, 2019, author's own translation). 
When Ghana's considerably large Jubilee field was discovered in 2007, President John Kufuor told the 
BBC (2007) that “with oil as a shot in the arm, we're going to fly […]. We're going to really zoom, 
accelerate […]. You come back in five years, and you'll see that Ghana truly is the African tiger, in 
economic terms, for development”. Ghana did not, obviously, turn into the African tiger by 2012. One 
may also doubt whether the on-going exploitation of Argentina's Vaca Muerta field will revolutionise 
employment everywhere between Cape Horn and the Iguazú Waterfalls, and turn Argentina into an 
energy world power.
Neither Kufuor nor Macri explained how and why resource abundance would have such tremen-
dous effects on the Argentinean and Ghanaian economy, respectively. The point to be made here is 
that such expectations exists and they have shaped the political debates in the two countries. Breul 
and his co-authors would probably agree that the just mentioned hopes are unrealistic. In their article, 
they elaborate on the relocation of basic tasks from Singapore—the gateway city—to two neighbour-
ing countries. For example, oil field service providers such as Baker Hughes and Schlumberger have 
established facilities in Vietnam. They can be expected to train Vietnamese staff and suppliers, in-
ducing process and product upgrading in what Gereffi, Humphrey, and Sturgeon (2005) call “captive 
relations”.2 A Vietnamese supply industry for activities such as drilling has emerged. In Indonesia, 
indigenous companies are involved in services such as catering, logistics, and security as well as 
simple manufacture and repair of equipment. Some Indonesian firms even carry out geophysical data 
analysis and offshore drilling. The aforementioned article by Scholvin, Breul, et al. (2019) provides 
further examples of how Singapore induces peripheral development in the oil and gas sector.
Yet, it appears that this is considered unsatisfying. Breul and his co-authors point out that oil field 
service providers and other important firms in Indonesia and Vietnam are not, usually, indigenous. 
Sophisticated equipment and technology are imported instead of being produced domestically. Expert 
staff fly in from Singapore. The authors hence conclude that the gateway city filters gains at the ex-
pense of subordinate places. There are, however, less than a dozen firms worldwide involved in tech-
nically sophisticated oil field service provision. No matter whether oil and gas is extracted in a least 
developed country like Equatorial Guinea, an emerging economy such as Vietnam, or in the Global 
North, say in Norway—indigenous firms in the most sophisticated segments of the upstream sector 
are rare or non-existent. The equipment they use is produced at a few sites worldwide; so is new tech-
nology, for instance for ultra-deepsea drilling. Experts belong to a globally mobile knowledge elite.
It is striking how differently others see the prospects of resource peripheries. The argument at the 
heart of various studies by the Policy Research in International Services and Manufacturing (PRISM) 
unit at the University of Cape is that lead firms—in extractive industries and other sectors— concentrate 
on their core business. They not only search globally for lowest-cost suppliers, but also have a prefer-
ence for firms close to where they operate. Particularly in developing countries with their considerable 
challenges regarding logistics and transport, the need for spatial proximity is high. Not only backward 
and forward linkages thus result from integration into global networks. Fiscal and horizontal ones are 
created as well, provided that certain conditions are fulfilled (Morris et al., 2012a, 2012b).
   | 115SCHOLVIN
Quite interestingly, the empirical findings of PRISM research are not that different from what 
Breul and his co-authors observe in Indonesia and Vietnam. Resource peripheries usually provide 
semi-qualified labour and generic services, whereas companies from abroad engage in activities that 
are intensive in capital and knowledge. PRISM scholars, however, see something positive in locally 
provided generic services, even if they are as simple as catering and security, and even if their con-
tribution to diversifying the local economies under consideration is uncertain at best.3 Breul and his 
co-authors as well as the aforementioned scholars who concentrate on diversification apparently have 
higher expectations on peripheral development.
Against this backdrop, it is worthwhile to reassess the interplay of gateway/world cities and pe-
ripheral locations, investigating the division of business activities between different sites that are 
connected in global networks. Further to that, this article builds inroads into better understanding 
obstacles to peripheral development, including the impact of gateway cities but not being limited to it.
3 |  CASE SELECTION AND METHODOLOGY
Numerous gateways globally interlink resource peripheries in South America and sub-Saharan Africa 
(or anywhere else in the world). In order to build inroads into a topic not covered well by existing 
research such as the relationships of gateway cities and subordinate places, diverse cases are most 
suitable. Diverse cases do not necessarily mirror the distribution of the variation of the phenomenon in 
consideration, but they come close to covering the full variation. In qualitative research, diverse cases 
are the best path towards representativeness (Seawright & Gerring, 2008).4
With regard to case selection, it appears worthwhile adding that the aforementioned article by 
Breul et al. (2019) refers to an extreme case: Singapore, an “alpha +”- world city according to the 
latest GaWC (2018) assessment, which offers one of the most sophisticated business environments 
worldwide and competes with resource peripheries in nearby developing countries. It is not surprising 
that Singapore concentrates so many activities related to oil and gas at the expense of its neighbour-
hood. This means that the study by Breul and his co-authors does not allow for generalisation. It is 
unlikely that all gateway cities exert filtering mechanisms to the extent and in the way that Singapore 
does. Analysing such an extreme case is rather helpful for explorative research.
Cities in Argentina and Ghana, meanwhile, are suitable as diverse cases because of the different 
levels of development of the two countries. Despite its shaky economy, Argentina is a high-income 
country, according to the World Bank’s (2019) definition. Buenos Aires once belonged to the top 
world cities—being culturally and economically at par with London and Paris—but stagnated in the 
course of the last century, as much as the entire country did. Today, GaWC (2018) researchers con-
sider Buenos Aires an “alpha”-world city, comparable to Frankfurt and Melbourne regarding its rel-
evance for the world city network. Ghana, on the contrary, is a lower middle-income economy. More 
than half of the adult population earn their living in agriculture and fishing. The rise of Accra to what 
Grant (2012) calls a “globalizing city” dates back to liberalisation policies introduced at the national 
scale in 1983. According to GaWC, Accra is a “gamma +”-world city, meaning as unimportant as 
Cleveland or Glasgow. It is, hence, reasonable to expect Buenos Aires to attract more sophisticated 
business activities than Accra, also implying more potential for relocation to peripheral sites.
What is more, oil and gas extraction is a recent phenomenon in Ghana. First onshore wells were 
drilled as early as 1896. In the 1970s, rudimentary offshore exploration began. Commercially viable 
findings were made in 2007. Argentina, conversely, has been exploiting hydrocarbons since 1907. It 
can be expected to feature expertise in the oil and gas sector—held by firms based in Buenos Aires 
and at peripheral sites. With regard to Ghana, one would assume that the country depends on foreign 
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firms exploring and exploiting its hydrocarbon resources. They have taken first steps to expand into 
this new market, probably concentrating their activities in Accra instead of more peripheral locations. 
The role of indigenous companies is most likely limited to the provision of generic services.
The oil and gas sector offers practical advantages for this study—besides the fact that it makes 
the findings easily comparable with those by Breul and his co-authors. First, the oil and gas sector is 
marked by a clear linear configuration, with the location of key assets and major players being easy 
to identify. Second and somewhat counterintuitively, the sector is relatively transparent. Basic infor-
mation on investments, ownership of/service provision to oil and gas fields is available online. During 
his field research, the author of this article found lead firms and small enterprises to be accessible 
for interviews and willing to provide details on their location strategy and cooperation with other 
companies.
The oil and gas sector consists of down-, mid-, and upstream activities. Upstream includes search-
ing for oil and gas fields, drilling wells, and operating these wells. Midstream involves transport, 
storage, and wholesale marketing of crude and purified/refined products. Downstream comprises re-
fining crude oil and purifying raw natural gas, and marketing and distribution of consumer products. 
Integrated oil companies such as Chevron and Shell have separate business units for down- and up-
stream that hardly interact. Other lead firms—Anadarko and Puma Energy, for instance—only engage 
in either down- or upstream. Suppliers are hardly ever involved in both sub-sectors. For these reasons, 
the following empirical analysis is limited to upstream. The gateway function of industrial process-
ing—for example, by petrochemical industries—is not covered.
In addition to existing academic literature, information has been obtained from the Energy 
Information Administration and the website “A Barrel Full”. The latter provides information on all ac-
tive oil and gas fields worldwide, indicating the respective operators and most important service pro-
viders. Office locations of these firms can be identified online, leading to a first overview of location 
patterns.5 During research trips in 2016 and 2017, narrative, open-ended interviews were carried out 
with business lobbies, public authorities and, more important, local and transnational enterprises. The 
objective of the interviews was to learn about location strategies, inter-firm relations (especially with 
regard to local suppliers), the intra-firm division of labour, and advantages that Accra and Buenos 
Aires as well as subordinate places offer.
The empirical analysis is thus largely based on information obtained from interviews. As far as 
possible, the corresponding insights are triangulated with academic literature and sources of descrip-
tive data. This implies not only a strength in explaining causal mechanisms that lead to/work against 
peripheral development, but also shortcomings in terms of quantification. Qualitative approaches 
have, nonetheless, become critical in research on economic networks. As Vind and Fold point out, 
it is impossible to capture the role of corporate control and corporate services (as well as other fea-
tures, I would add) for these networks “without intensive fieldwork, including corporate interviews; 
databases and surveys cannot provide the data needed” (2010, p. 72). In other words, qualitative re-
search is able to explain specificities of networks, which quantitative approaches only map (Watson 
& Beaverstock, 2014).
In the following pages, reference is made to 40 interviews—23 from Argentina and 17 from 
Ghana—out of a total of 51 conducted for the research presented here. The interviews not referred to 
revolved around topics that are not central to the article (corruption in Argentina, for instance). No 
contradictory information has been omitted. The interviewees—consultants, leading executives of 
large companies, and directors of small businesses—were identified via LinkedIn and by snowball 
sampling. Except for a few cases, the interviews were conducted with one interviewee at a time. A 
guideline of eight questions that cover the objectives mentioned in the next-to-last paragraph was 
used. The questions were adapted slightly before each interview, reflecting on the interviewee's area 
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of expertise and the exact nature of his/her company or organisation. The interviews lasted 20 to 
80 minutes. They were recorded and later structured along the four relevant functions of gateway 
cities (logistics and transport, corporate control, service provision, and knowledge generation). Direct 
quotes from the interviews in Argentina are the author's translation.
4 |  EMPIRICAL FINDINGS
Each of the following sub-sections begins with background information on the upstream oil and 
gas sector. Afterwards, the role of gateway cities—Accra and Buenos Aires—is assessed along the 
functions of logistics and transport, corporate control, service provision, and knowledge generation. 
Opportunities for peripheral development are explained as well as obstacles in this regard. Tables 1 
and 2 further below summarise the findings.
4.1 | Accra and the hinterland in Ghana
In 2007, oil deposits were found off the coast of Ghana, close to the border with Ivory Coast, arising 
considerable interest among oil majors. The largest field—the Jubilee field, operated by Tullow in 
cooperation with Anadarko, Kosmos, and the Ghana National Petroleum Corporation—contains re-
serves of 600 million barrels of oil equivalent (A Barrel Full, 2014b). Commercial production began 
in 2010. The more recently discovered Cape Three Points field (operated by Eni in partnership with 
Vitol and the Petroleum Corporation) as well as the Tweneboa, Enyenra, and Ntomme fields (oper-
ated by Tullow, its Jubilee partners, and Sabre) will further increase Ghana's oil and gas production 
(A Barrel Full, 2014a, 2019).
Accra has become the key place for corporate control in Ghana's emerging oil and gas sector. It 
is not only the capital and commercial hub of the country, but also the most internationalised city. 
The oil findings have given a boost to this role of Accra, best exemplified by the expansion of new 
urban districts, where transnational companies concentrate in close proximity to Ghana's only inter-
national airport (Grant, 2012). Interviewees explained that the country managers of all oil majors, the 
Petroleum Corporation, the Ghana Petroleum Commission, which is the upstream regulator, and other 
important public authorities are located in Accra.6 Two summarised the relevance of the city, saying 
that “everything is in Accra”.7
The concentration of corporate headquarters offers prospects for local businesses. An indigenous 
firm with 275 employees provides 90 vehicles and personal driving services to Tullow, for example. 
It works with local car dealers and providers of spare parts such as batteries, and contracts repair 
services in Accra, indicating backward linkages that affect the wider economy of the city.8 From a 
more general perspective, a consultant explained that Ghanaian firms plug into the oil and gas sector 
as providers of generic services—similar to the just mentioned case. He added that it is unrealistic to 
expect Ghanaian businesspeople and enterprises to take a lead role for upstream activities or venture 
into sophisticated services such as drilling and seismic studies because of capital intensity and the 
associated high risk.9
Regardless of the level of sophistication, service provision for the upstream sector is not, however, 
concentrated in Accra—with the exceptions of driving services and tasks related to office buildings 
such as cleaning, gardening, and security. Although firms that provide technical services for the up-
stream sector usually manage their business activities from Accra, the physical work takes place in 
Takoradi—about 230 kilometres west of Accra and connected to the capital by a road in relatively 
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good condition and several non-stop flights a day that take 40 minutes.10 Once a sleepy coastal town, 
Takoradi has become the operational hub for the upstream sector because it is the closest harbour to 
the offshore fields. Land, labour, and housing have been profoundly and often negatively affected by 
the oil boom (Obeng-Odoom, 2009, 2014b; Oteng-Ababio, 2016). Takoradi—not Accra—serves as 
logistics and services gateway to Ghana's oil and gas fields, with specialised service providers such as 
Belmet 7, Oceaneering, and the Expro Group carrying out physical operations there. An interviewee 
explained that his firm receives equipment from overseas, verifies its proper functioning, stores it at 
the port of Takoradi, and dispatches it to the nearby oil and gas fields whenever needed.11 Having such 
a hub in close proximity to the site of operation is a practical necessity: “we cannot send equipment 
back to the U[nited] K[ingdom] […] for servicing”, said another interviewee.12
This locational pattern also applies to Ghanaian companies, which provide generic services. An 
interviewee involved in freight forwarding explained that the offices for administration and customer 
contact are in Accra, whereas most of the actual work takes place in Takoradi.13 Another freight for-
warder has the head office in Accra too—“within five kilometres of [the headquarters of] all major oil 
and gas firms”.14 The bulk of business is in Takoradi. Rather than filtering gains, Accra hence bundles 
corporate control and interlinks the physical work done in Takoradi. This way, it induces economic 
dynamics at a subordinate place, which is particularly surprising because Takoradi did not have a basis 
for oil and gas-related development just 15 years ago.
Ghanaian firms also enhance their skills and gain new ones because of their involvement in the 
sector, as they must meet strict standards before they can bid for tasks outsourced by oil and gas 
companies. A third freight forwarder hired foreign health and safety trainers when they decided to 
expand into oil and gas. Now, they are “formalising everything, making sure that everything can be 
accounted for”.15 One of the aforementioned firms has introduced a digitalised database accessible for 
customers. It has also begun using GPS tracking for its lorries.16 The upgrading of capabilities is “an 
on-going process. You may not have everything that [the client] requires when it comes to the skills 
[…], but you have at least a reasonable part of [what it demanded]”.17 These forms of upskilling hold 
an important potential for Ghana as a whole. A consultant stressed that Ghanaian professionals—for 
example welders—do not, at present, meet international standards. Foreign investment in oil and gas 
is an opportunity to “lift the entire economy up to these standards”.18
An interviewee from one of the first oil majors that invested in Ghana remembered that when 
they arrived in the country, “there was a vacuum here—not even catering [could be contracted to our 
standards]”.19 He added that the situation has changed by now. Joint ventures of Ghanaian and foreign 
firms—with the former holding 51% of the shares—have become typical for drilling, rig washing, and 
well services, among others. In these partnerships, the Ghanaians bring in local contacts and labour, 
while the foreigners have expertise, technology, and access to finance.20 This shift reflects legislation 
introduced at the beginning of this decade, according to which the share of foreign products, services, 
and staff in the oil and gas sector must be reduced to almost 0% from the beginning of extraction until 
10 years later (Arthur & Arthur, 2014). Joint ventures do not, apparently, fall under these restrictions.
In exceptional cases, Ghanaian firms have managed to internationalise—not only, but also because 
of their involvement in oil and gas. An entrepreneur whose company is based in Takoradi explained 
that they ventured into oil and gas in 2007. With prior experience in the disposal of toxic waste in 
the shipping industry, they started handling such material produced by oil field operators. This sector 
proved to be extremely profitable, providing substantial amounts of money to the company and forcing 
it to increase its capabilities. Today, they have operations in Benin, Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Togo. 
Ivory Coast and Senegal are also interesting markets according to the interviewee because hydrocar-
bon extraction on a relatively large scale may begin there soon.21
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However, there are considerable challenges to locally embedding the oil and gas sector. As noted, 
indigenous firms hardly ever venture into the provision of sector-specific, sophisticated products and 
services. Even in joints ventures, their contribution is usually limited to generic assets. This reflects 
the fact that Ghana has a very short history of oil and gas extraction. Ablo and Overå (2015) report 
that indigenous firms are, moreover, often not aware of business opportunities, unless they may rely 
on personal contacts at the Petroleum Commission. The low efficiency of state institutions regarding 
business registration, certificates on sales taxes, and similar issues creates additional obstacles. Ablo 
(2017) adds that small enterprises tend to fail to pre-qualify for calls for bids because potential clients 
deem their management insufficiently professional, their financial capacities and insurances too low 
(or non-existent), and their experience in providing the products and services in consideration too little 
(or insufficiently certificated).
In another publication, Ablo (2015) explains in this regard that the impact of the Enterprise 
Development Centre in Takoradi has been mostly limited to a few relatively large companies with 
prior experience in the mining and shipping industries. Their business activities include installation of 
machinery, logistics services, piping, and thermal insulation, among others. The centre provides busi-
ness training on book keeping, safety procedures, and similar issues. It serves as an entry point to the 
oil and gas sector for Ghanaian firms. Yet, the firms that have completed the programmes offered by 
the centre are not overly successful in obtaining oil and gas contracts according to Ablo. He concludes 
that the centre has largely failed to meet its objective to support SMEs—typically involved in catering, 
cleaning, and the recruitment of rig workers—to improve their competitiveness and take advantage of 
business opportunities.
Conditions being unfavourable for indigenous firms are not the only challenge to peripheral devel-
opment. One of the aforementioned interviewees explained that “some [local] companies have priced 
themselves out. It's been cheaper for me to buy an item in the UK, and get it shipped across here, and 
pay customs and tax and clearance than it is to actually obtain the item here”. He continued, saying 
that “the items are not [from] here. [Local providers] go out and source them, but they really put a 
mark on them. […] We had one [local] company trying to charge us 100 [US] dollars for a certain 
item, but you get it on Amazon for [USD] 9.99”.22
Some foreign companies encourage the practice of distribution through indigenous firms, as they 
put potential local suppliers in touch with their preferred equipment manufacturers from abroad.23 In 
theory, this constitutes a path towards upgrading for the intermediaries—by maintenance and repair 
of the products they distribute as a first step and later by own production. Reality appears to be differ-
ent: “you may have a company in Takoradi that goes to a company in Accra that has actually brought 
this item in. So [the firm in Takoradi] purchases it. […] By the time it comes to the end user, it's […] 
unrealistically expensive”.24 What this statement shows is that Accra serves as a gateway city. Traders 
based in Takoradi depend on their partners in the capital to access global markets. One may argue 
that this intermediary role of Accra reveals filtering mechanisms because players in the gateway city 
capture a considerable share of the profits or try to do so. Still, rent-seeking behaviour is the decisive 
obstacle to peripheral development, as it prevents local firms from plugging into global networks and 
appears to predominate over efforts towards upgrading. With Ghanaian enterprises being intermedi-
aries that import foreign-manufactured products, the domestic linkages of the oil and gas sector also 
remain shallow, meaning that much value addition occurs abroad.
Furthermore, legislation on local content is abused by some local suppliers. An interviewee ex-
plained that “the local content law [forces] you to give preference within [a price margin of] 10% 
to indigenous companies […]. If I buy welding electrodes in Europe, I will pay […] 6 [US] dollars 
per package. If I go to the dealer of the same brand, an official dealer that is a joint venture [here in 
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Ghana], I will pay [USD] 10, and the indigenous companies know the price. So they charge you [USD] 
11 [for the electrodes they import from Europe] and you have to go to them because it is the law”.25
Table 1 summarises the findings on the interplay of Accra and its hinterland. Following the inter-
views conducted by the author and available academic literature, knowledge generation related to the 
oil and gas sector does not occur in Ghana.
4.2 | Buenos Aires and the Argentinean hinterland
Argentina is South America's largest natural gas producer and a significant producer of oil. Its cor-
responding reserves amount to 2.4 billion barrels of proven conventional oil, 27 billion barrels of 
technically recoverable shale oil as well as 11.1 trillion cubic feet of conventional and unconven-
tional natural gas. Most of the unconventional resources are part of the Vaca Muerta field in north 
Patagonia, which is one of the largest deposits of shale oil and gas worldwide (Energy Information 
Administration, 2017). The attractiveness Argentina's upstream sector has been boosted by policies 
pursued since the 2015 presidential election. A stimulus programme for natural gas extraction was 
launched in that year. Foreign exchange controls were lifted. The conservative Macri government, 
whose mandate ended in December 2019, also successfully negotiated with investors and trade unions 
so as to reduce the costs of operation and avoid strikes.26
The gateway role of Buenos Aires—just like the one of Accra—is based on corporate control with 
regard to the national scale. Across all interviews conducted in that city, it was stated that important 
Argentinean and foreign firms concentrate their administrative, commercial, and technological activ-
ities there. Strategic decisions on the Argentinean hinterland are taken in Buenos Aires. Interviewees 
explained that the reason for this is the density of key players in the city—in particular providers 
of corporate services on finance and the law, specialised suppliers, oil majors (including the semi-
statal giant YPF), and the government.27 On several occasions, interviewees began their response 
to the question about the location advantages of Buenos Aires by saying “Dios está en todos lados, 
pero atiende en Buenos Aires”—God is everywhere, but his office is in Buenos Aires.28 Even medi-
um-sized firms from provinces rich in oil and gas often have an office in Buenos Aires—for “rela-
tional purposes”, as an interviewee explained.29
T A B L E  1  Gateway functions of Accra and hinterland locations, and implications for development
Gateway function Accra Hinterland Implications for development
Logistics and 
transport
International airport Harbour of Takoradi (in 
close proximity to oil 
and gas fields)
See “service provision”
Corporate control Administration/head 
offices of all firms; 
public authorities
None None in terms of controlling the 
sector, with the exception of the 
Petroleum Corporation
Service provision Driving services 
and work related to 
office buildings
Operational bases for 
all services related 
to exploring and 
extracting oil and gas
Provision of generic services by local 
firms; backward linkages; upgrading/





Source: Author's own draft.
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Very different from Ghana, corporate control of the Argentinean upstream sector is exerted by 
domestic and foreign firms. Next to YPF, there are players from abroad such as Shell and Wintershall 
as well as Argentinean companies—Pan American Energy and Tecpetrol, for instance. They assume 
the roles of strategic partners and specialised suppliers. Regardless of their origin, these firms engage 
much more with the local economy than their counterparts in Ghana do. Most importantly, knowledge 
generation concentrates in Buenos Aires. Several interviewees mentioned good universities and their 
graduates when explaining why they carry out research-intensive activities in Buenos Aires.30 The 
sector's lead firms also outsource geological studies to institutes in the gateway city.31 Exceptions from 
this pattern are few. Petrobras, which sold the majority of the shares of its Argentinean subsidiary in 
2016, invested in a centre of applied technology in Neuquén. The centre carried out geological and 
engineering studies.32
The concentration of corporate control and knowledge generation is reinforced by a soft location 
advantage of Buenos Aires. Its relevance should not be underestimated. Interviewees emphasised that 
Buenos Aires is a “cosmopolitan” city and offers “a comfortable lifestyle”.33 Cities and towns in close 
proximity to Argentina's oil and gas fields, conversely, are not popular—neither with foreigners, nor 
with Argentineans. Interviewees highlighted that their respective companies face severe problems to 
persuade employees to move there.34 In consequence, some oil and gas-related activities—in particu-
lar engineering and geological research—largely remain in the gateway city, even though companies 
may prefer to relocate them to peripheral sites. This can be seen as a filtering mechanism, yet one very 
different from the hard location advantages Breul et al. (2019) refer to.
Logistics and transport connect better to the concept advanced by these authors. Buenos Aires is 
the only hub for air travel in Argentina, although this pattern appears to be changing because of low-
cost airlines now offering direct routes between provincial capitals. An interviewee explained that his 
firm—like most large companies in the upstream sector—is involved in projects at various locations 
across the country. Equipment and staff needed at more than one site is concentrated in Buenos Aires 
for this reason.35 The harbours of the city (Puerto Nuevo) and province (Dock Sud)—the latter is lo-
cated at the edge of the city of Buenos Aires—are the largest container ports in the country, with cargo 
handlings of a respective 845,000 and 526,000 TEUs in 2017 (Ministerio de Transporte, 2018).36 
Interviewees mentioned the ports and their comparatively high efficiency as location advantages of 
Buenos Aires.37 These infrastructures reduce the extent to which logistics can be relocated to the hin-
terland, reducing the prospects of development there.
Although Buenos Aires is by far the largest market for industrial goods, where even firms from 
the interior of the country purchase some of their inputs because of lower prices,38 operators resort 
to suppliers closer to oil and gas fields—either local firms or foreign ones with a presence there. 
The reason for this is the considerable distance between the resource peripheries and Buenos Aires: 
Mendoza and Neuquén are about 1,000 kilometres away from the gateway city; Santa Cruz and Tierra 
del Fuego more than 2,000. Hiring suppliers close to where their products and services are needed 
saves costs and time of transport. It also allows for a quick reaction to any urgent problem that might 
occur.39 Further to that, legislation on local content refers to the provincial level in Argentina, making 
a certain decentralisation legally binding.40
In order to coordinate the work on the ground, non-local firms have limited administrative capac-
ities in the capitals of hydrocarbon-rich provinces, duplicating the structures of their national head 
offices there. The operational bases are located directly on site or in towns nearby.41 As an interviewee 
explained, offices in provincial capitals implement decisions taken in Buenos Aires.42 Local compa-
nies that reach a certain size largely follow the same pattern, concentrating their administration in 
cities such as Neuquén and running operational bases closer to oil and gas fields, in towns like Añelo 
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and Rincón de los Sauces, for example.43 SMEs bundle administration and operation at one place, 
which is not necessarily the provincial capital.44
In the province of Neuquén, the dynamics of the upstream sector has led to the establishment of 
administration and transport centres as well as industrial and logistics parks (Landriscini, Preiss, & 
Avellá, 2017). A local entrepreneur explained that he began with little experience in oil and gas, and 
included more and more services to the portfolio of his firm, offering to his clients what they had 
previously obtained from non-local suppliers.45 Oil majors and specialised service providers are in-
volved in upskilling labour, especially engineers. They expect their suppliers to work according to the 
standards that apply to them too.46 Obviously, such a transfer of knowledge does not apply to all large 
corporations, but their high requirements force local firms to upgrade. Executives of a local chamber 
of commerce agreed that such processes are vital to SMEs because they enable them to venture into 
markets abroad.47 The first step in that direction is the provision of maintenance services for equip-
ment brought in by foreign firms, which allows local contractors to get familiar with new technology.48 
In other words, there are expectations that resource peripheries in Argentina will become “learning 
regions” and achieve a structural transformation as such (Scholvin, 2019a).
There are downsides to the integration into the oil and gas sector though. Labour has been heavily 
outsourced since the privatisation of YPF in 1993. Job creation is unstable, being closely linked to the 
pace of drilling (Landriscini, Robles, & Carignano, 2015). Foreign contractors such as Baker Hughes, 
Halliburton, and Schlumberger provide technology-intensive services.49 Local firms typically con-
tribute labour and carry out low-tech services—electro-mechanical services, road construction, soil 
movement, and transport of liquid cargo, for instance. Some of them also engage in services specific to 
the oil and gas sector such as well termination, which does not happen in Ghana. Kozulj and Lugones 
(2007) find that local companies tend to be second- and third-tier suppliers, usually subcontracted by 
first-tier suppliers from abroad. Oil field operators and first-tier suppliers pass the task of lowering 
costs to local firms and, through more flexible contracts, to subcontracted labour (Landriscini, 2017). 
An interviewee from a specialised service provider explained that local companies “have to improve 
their efficiency […]. Today, they offer a service at 40 [US] dollars. In half a year, they have to do it for 
[USD] 20 and in a year, for [USD] 10”.50
Other challenges are typical for SMEs. In some cases, much larger non-local suppliers have ab-
sorbed highly competitive local firms or headhunted their employees.51 Many SMEs fail to obtain 
contracts because pre-bidding assessment ascribes high relevance to their annual turnover. If it is 
considered too low, the respective companies will not be allowed to bid. The reason for this is that 
overly large projects put suppliers and their clients at risk, with the former going bankrupt and the 
latter being legally responsible for any unfinished work, in the worst case.52 Furthermore, larger ser-
vice providers have idle equipment and staff that they deploy in case of demand, shifting these assets 
from one country to another. Local firms depend on a single market. This is particularly problematic 
because there is uncertainty about the timing and volume of future investment by oil field operators, 
not at least as a result of general economic and political instability in Argentina.53 Due to financial 
constraints—reinforced by Argentina's exceptionally high interest rates—local firms can hardly invest 
in technology that would allow them to offer more than generic services.54 This prevents them from 
venturing into more sophisticated activities that they could export in accordance with the expectations 
mentioned in the next-to-last paragraph. Most demonstratively, in the province of Neuquén, which is 
home to the Vaca Muerta field, there are no local firms that carry out drilling.55
Table 2 summarises the findings on the interplay of Buenos Aires and its hinterland.
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5 |  CONCLUSION
This article revisited gateway–hinterland relations, shedding light on the interactions of world cities 
that serve as gateways with subordinate places. It also uncovered obstacles to peripheral develop-
ment, including and going beyond the concentration of business activities in gateway cities. Accra 
and Buenos Aires—the gateway cities to the hinterlands of Argentina and Ghana, respectively—were 
found to generate certain opportunities for development through integration into global networks. 
These are, at present, largely limited to generic services. Hence, the reality of peripheral development 
remains far from expectations raised by overly ambitious politicians and, in the case of Argentina, 
also local stakeholders. Although filtering mechanisms of Accra and, even more so, Buenos Aires 
somewhat limit the prospects of peripheral development, other obstacles appear to be more important.
With regard to Ghana, it has been shown that Accra serves as a gateway because corporate control 
concentrates there. The reason for this is the density of key players, in particular oil majors and public 
authorities. Logistics and services, meanwhile, are channelled through the town of Takoradi, in close 
proximity to the offshore oil and gas fields. Ghanaian firms reinforce their capabilities because of their 
involvement in oil and gas, adapting to higher standards. This may have positive implications for the 
entire national economy. In exceptional cases, indigenous companies internationalise their business 
activities. Joint ventures of foreign investors and domestic partners have become mandatory. Local 
firms involved in oil and gas generate backward linkages, whose magnitude remains beyond the scope 
of the analysis presented above. However, many indigenous firms are considered too inexperienced 
and too unprofessional by potential clients. They lack the necessary financial muscle to plug into the 
sector. In joint ventures, Ghanaians provide local contacts and labour, depending on the capital and 
technology of foreign shareholders. Ghanaians are, moreover, often unaware of business opportunities 
and have to cope with inefficient public authorities. For the provision of products needed in the oil 
and gas sector, indigenous companies are mere intermediaries that distribute foreign-manufactured 
inputs. Rent-seeking behaviour and the abuse of legislation on local content further hamper peripheral 
development.
In spite of a very different history of hydrocarbon extraction, Argentina is characterised by in-
triguing parallels with Ghana. The density of key players and related corporate control turns Buenos 
T A B L E  2  Gateway functions of Buenos Aires and hinterland locations, and implications for development
Gateway function Buenos Aires Hinterland Implications for development
Logistics and 
transport
Hub for air and maritime 
transport
Logistics parks of 
local relevance
None
Corporate control Administration, commercial, 
and technological activities of 
all firms; public authorities
None Argentinean lead firms, 
strategic partners, and 
specialised suppliers
Service provision Corporate services on finance 
and the law
Operational bases for 
all services related 
to exploring and 
extracting oil and gas
Provision of largely generic 
services by local firms; 




Universities (and their 
graduates); research institutes
Research facilities in 
exceptional cases
Specialised services provided 
by local organisations and 
Argentinean staff
Source: Author's own draft.
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Aires into a gateway city, whereas technical service provision happens in the resource peripheries. In 
contrast to Accra, Buenos Aires also serves as a logistics gateway and contributes knowledge needed 
by oil field operators and specialised service providers. Service provision in the resource peripheries 
allows for a considerable participation of local firms, contributing to their expansion and upskill-
ing. Administration and transport centres as well as industrial and logistics parks in the province of 
Neuquén further prove the benefits of integration into the world economy. Prospects of internation-
alisation hint at expected future revenues, whose magnitude cannot be assessed at present. Being 
subcontracted, local firms are under severe pressure to reduce costs though. Many are too small for 
more lucrative projects, lacking the financial means to invest in new equipment and technology, which 
also contradicts hopes of upgrading into more sophisticated tasks and related internationalisation. 
Dependence on a single market and uncertainty regarding future investments are significant disad-
vantages vis-à-vis larger competitors from abroad. Further to that, successful local firms are often 
absorbed by non-local rivals. Job creation in the resource peripheries is highly unstable.
These findings lead to three topics for follow-up studies. First, gateway-city formation in resource 
peripheries should be assessed. Takoradi apparently plays a gateway role. For downstream activities, 
which were not addressed in this article, the Argentinean city of Bahía Blanca serves as a hub—much 
more than Buenos Aires does (Scholvin, 2021). Second, there is need for a shared understanding of 
what counts as successful peripheral development. As explained above, some researchers focus on 
the structural transformation of the local economies under consideration. Others, in particular PRISM 
scholars, concentrate on linkages. Their evaluation of the same empirical findings tends to be very 
different, creating confusion. Third, similar to the research by Breul et al. (2019) on South-East Asia, 
this article showed that prospects for Argentina's and Ghana's resource peripheries are largely limited 
to providing generic services (although this is mostly due to factors other than filtering mechanisms 
by gateway cities). Legislation on local content appears unsuitable to facilitate the venturing of local 
firms into more sophisticated activities. It has negative side effects. From a policy perspective, one 
should, hence, consider whether a sector as intensive in capital and technology as upstream oil and gas 
is a realistic path towards peripheral development.
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ENDNOTES
 1 Given this research interest, the article does not provide a holistic picture of the oil and gas sector in Argentina and 
Ghana. Important topics such as prostitution in Takoradi related to the oil boom (Obeng-Odoom, 2014a) or conflicts 
with the Mapuche community in Neuquén (Aguirre, 2017), among others, are not covered. Further to that, while the 
author finds that oil and gas offers prospects for development, he is not necessarily an advocate of fossil fuels. 
 2 This article makes use of terminology from the literature on global production networks and global value chains. It 
is not, however, meant as a contribution to these important branches of research. The article focusses on the debate 
that has evolved around gateway/world cities and peripheral development instead. For more information on different 
forms of upgrading in global value chains, see: Humphrey and Schmitz (2002) as well as Kaplinsky and Morris 
(2001). 
 3 The corresponding studies have been published in a special issue of Resources Policy (volume 37, number 4). 
 4 For a general introduction to case-study research, see: Yin (2017). 
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 5 A Barrel Full is a wiki site. Subscribed members—not all visitors—can add, change, and remove content. This ap-
parently means that quality control depends on the members. It is not guaranteed by a recognised authority, as in the 
case of the Energy Information Administration. The information obtained from A Barrel Full and used in this article 
was cross-checked and can, therefore, be considered reliable. 
 6 Interviews with a specialised service provider, Accra, 3 October 2017, with oil field operators, Accra, 14 and 20 
October 2017, and with a firm that provides supply vessels, Accra, 18 October 2017. All interviewees spoke as in-
dividuals, not as representatives of their respective companies and organisations. Information on their professional 
affiliations is provided nonetheless to better contextualise the corresponding statements. 
 7 Interviews with a specialised service provider, Accra, 3 October 2017, and with an oil field operator, Accra, 12 
October 2017. 
 8 Interview with a generic service provider, Accra, 5 October 2017. 
 9 Interview with a consultant, Accra, 18 October 2017. 
 10 Interviews with two specialised service providers, Accra, 3 and 6 October 2017, and with an oil field operator, Accra, 
12 October 2017. 
 11 Interview with a specialised service provider, Takoradi, 9 October 2017. 
 12 Interview with a specialised service provider, Takoradi, 10 October 2017. 
 13 Interview with a freight forwarder, Takoradi, 11 October 2017. 
 14 Interview with a freight forwarder, Accra, 6 October 2017. 
 15 Interview with a freight forwarder, Accra, 5 October 2017. 
 16 Interview with a freight forwarder, Accra, 6 October 2017. 
 17 Interview with a freight forwarder, Takoradi, 11 October 2017. 
 18 Interview with a consultant, Accra, 18 October 2017. 
 19 Interview with an oil field operator, Accra, 12 October 2017. 
 20 Interview with a consultant, Takoradi, 10 October 2017. 
 21 Interview with a local waste management firm, Takoradi, 11 October 2017. 
 22 Interview with a specialised service provider, Takoradi, 9 October 2017. 
 23 Interview with a specialised service provider, Takoradi, 10 October 2017. 
 24 Interview with a specialised service provider, Takoradi, 9 October 2017. 
 25 Interview with a specialised service provider, Takoradi, 11 October 2017. 
 26 The recent election victory of the populist Frente de Todos marks a turning point for Argentina. The expectations 
related to foreign investment into oil and gas are, however, shared by the outgoing government and its successor. 
 27 Interviews with oil field operators, Buenos Aires, 10 June 2016, 27 April, 5 and 17 May 2017, and with specialised 
service providers, Buenos Aires, 5 and 17 May 2017. For a more detailed analysis of Buenos Aires as an oil and gas 
gateway, see: Scholvin (2019b). 
 28 Interviews with oil field operators, Buenos Aires, 27 April, 5 and 10 May 2017, and with specialised service provid-
ers, Buenos Aires, 5 May and 4 December 2017. 
 29 Interview with a local engineering firm, Neuquén, 29 November 2017. 
 30 Interviews with oil field operators, Buenos Aires, 5, 16, and 17 May 2017, and with specialised service providers, 
Buenos Aires, 5 May and 14 December 2017. 
 31 Interviews with an oil field operator, Buenos Aires, 5 May 2017, and with a consultant, Buenos Aires, 7 May 2017. 
 32 Interview with an oil field operator, Buenos Aires, 5 May 2017. 
 33 Interviews with an oil field operator and a specialised service provider, Buenos Aires, 5 May 2017. 
 34 Interviews with specialised service providers, Buenos Aires, 3 and 5 May 2017, and with an oil field operator, Buenos 
Aires, 5 May 2017. 
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 35 Interviews with specialised service providers, Buenos Aires, 3 and 5 May 2017, and with an oil field operator, Buenos 
Aires, 5 May 2017. 
 36 The twenty-foot equivalent unit (TEU) is a unit of cargo capacity used to describe the capacity of container ships and 
container terminals. It is based on the volume of a 20-foot-long intermodal container. 
 37 Interviews with oil field operators, Buenos Aires, 27 April and 10 May 2017. 
 38 Interview with a local engineering firm, Neuquén, 29 November 2017. 
 39 Interviews with specialised service providers, Buenos Aires, 9 and 17 May 2017, and with an oil field operator, 
Neuquén, 28 November 2017. 
 40 In practice, there are case-specific negotiations between foreign companies and the provincial governments, as an 
interviewee explained (Neuquén, 27 November 2017). The provincial governments appear to be rather flexible, using 
legislation on local content mainly as “a platform for dialogue” (Interview with an organisation that supports SMEs, 
Neuquén, 30 November 2017). This made executives of a local chamber of commerce claim that legislation on local 
content “is not fulfilled” (Neuquén, 23 November 2017). 
 41 Interviews with an oil field operator, Neuquén, 22 November 2017, and with specialised service providers, Buenos 
Aires and Neuquén, 29 and 30 November and 14 December 2017. 
 42 Interviews with specialised service providers, Neuquén, 29 November 2017. 
 43 Interview with a local engineering firm, Neuquén, 29 November 2017. 
 44 Interviews with generic service providers, Allen and Neuquén, 28 November 2017. 
 45 Interview with a generic service provider, Allen, 28 November 2017. 
 46 Interviews with an oil field operator, Neuquén, 22 November 2017, and with a specialised service provider, Neuquén, 
29 November 2017. 
 47 Interview with a local chamber of commerce, Neuquén, 23 November 2017. 
 48 Interviews with the provincial government, Neuquén, 27 November 2017, and with an organisation that supports 
SMEs, Neuquén, 30 November 2017. 
 49 Interview with an oil field operator, Buenos Aires, 17 May 2017. 
 50 Interview with a specialised service provider, Buenos Aires, 9 May 2017. 
 51 Interview with a local chamber of commerce, Neuquén, 23 November 2017. 
 52 Interview with an oil field operator, Neuquén, 28 November 2017. 
 53 Interview with a local engineering firm, Neuquén, 29 November 2017. 
 54 Interview with the provincial government, Neuquén, 27 November 2017. 
 55 Interview with an organisation that supports SMEs, Neuquén, 30 November 2017. 
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